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W(H)ITHER GLUCKSBERG? 
RONALD TURNER* 
ABSTRACT 
This article is a tale of two significant United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that an asserted right to 
physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected 
by the clause because it is not a right deeply rooted in this nation's history 
and tradition. More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that 
state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Due Process 
Clause. In so holding, the Obergefell Court departed from Glucksberg’s 
history-and-tradition analysis and instead applied an evolving, 
generational approach in deciding the substantive due process issue 
before it. Dissenting in Obergefell, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
argued that the majority had effectively overruled Glucksberg. A 
different view was expressed in a 2017 speech by then-Judge and now-
Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh in which he argued that Glucksberg stands 
today as an important precedent insuring that the Court operates as a 
court of law and not as an institution of social policy. This article 
examines these differing views and several post-Obergefell decisions 
shedding helpful but not dispositive light on this important aspect of 
substantive due process jurisprudence and doctrine. As concluded 
herein, and contrary to declarations and predictions of its demise, 
Glucksberg was not overruled, effectively or otherwise, by Obergefell.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This article is a tale of two significant United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 
Washington v. Glucksberg2 held that an asserted right to physician-
assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
clause, because that claimed right is not deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and tradition. Obergefell v. Hodges3 held that state laws 
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex violated the 
clause. In so holding, the Court, noting Glucksberg’s history-and-
tradition analysis, concluded that while that approach may have been 
appropriate in the context of physician-assisted suicide, it was not 
consistent with the Court’s approach in other fundamental rights 
decisions.4 Both cases were decided by 5-4 votes, with Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy casting the deciding vote in both rulings. 
What remains of Glucksberg in the wake of Obergefell? Did 
Obergefell overrule Glucksberg, as Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 2. 521 U.S. 702 (1997), discussed infra Part II. 
 3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), discussed infra Part IV. 
 4. See id. at 2602. 
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argued in his Obergefell dissent?5 Or, as then-Judge and now Justice 
Brett M. Kavanaugh observed in a post-Obergefell speech, does 
Glucksberg stand “to this day as an important precedent, limiting the 
Court’s role in the realm of social policy and helping to ensure that the 
Court operates more as a court of law and less as an institution of social 
policy[?]”6 These important questions have not been definitively 
answered by the Court but have been considered in post-Obergefell 
lower court rulings, shedding helpful light on this aspect of the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence. Gleaned from those cases is a 
provisional answer to this article’s w(h)ither Glucksberg query: 
Glucksberg’s methodology has survived, as evidenced by courts’ and 
judges’ post-Obergefell use of the Glucksberg two-step analysis.7 
The article unfolds as follows. Part I’s prefatory and chronological 
backdrop discusses the tradition referent and employment of legal 
traditionalist methodology in the Court’s substantive due process 
decisions. Part II examines Glucksberg, and Part III turns to post-
Glucksberg Court decisions first rejecting and subsequently applying 
Glucksberg’s history-and-tradition approach. Obergefell is the focus of 
Part IV. Part V, assessing the argument that Obergefell laid waste to and 
has definitely replaced the Glucksberg methodology, surveys recent 
post-Obergefell lower court decisions which continue to apply 
Glucksberg in turning away substantive due process challenges to 
certain governmental actions. 
I. TRADITION, TRADITIONALISM, AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Tradition, understood here as “our name for [a] repository of 
accustomed practices,”8 has long been a factor considered by the Court 
and individual Justices in decisions addressing the constitutionality of 
due process claims.9 The “central traditionalist idea is that one should 
be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were 
acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments 
 
 5. See infra notes 179 and 184 and accompanying text. 
 6. Brett M. Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist 16 (2017 Walter Berns Constitution Day Lecture), http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/from-the-bench.pdf.   
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1991). 
 9. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental 
Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2006) (discussing tradition’s role in Supreme Court 
decisions).  
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have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.”10 Some jurists 
view tradition as a limiting principle; that is, an objective criterion 
preventing the substitution of judicial preferences for those of 
legislators.11 For those who subscribe to the view that the Due Process 
Clause “is generally tradition-protecting”12 and “suitably backward-
looking,”13 established and customary positions and practices are of 
interest when the constitutionality of those positions and practices are 
challenged. 
A. Early Cases 
An early exemplar of the Court’s reference to and focus on 
tradition is found in Dred Scott v. Sandford,14 the “birthplace of the 
controversial idea of substantive due process.”15 In concluding that 
enslaved Africans and their descendants were not and could not be 
citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Roger Taney looked to “the 
legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the 
Declaration of Independence” as well as “the public history of every 
European nation.”16 Taney stated that the opinion that blacks were 
“beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
white race . . . and . . . had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect” was “fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white 
race [and was] regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics.”17 
In its 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon,18 the Court opined that 
constitutional questions “are not settled by even a consensus of present 
public opinion,” and that where there is a debatable issue of fact “a 
 
 10. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
891 (1996). 
 11. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process 
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540 (2012).  
 12. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 (1996). 
 13. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004). 
 14. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 15. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 40 (1997); see also AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE 
LIVE BY 119 (2012) (the phrase substantive due process comes from judges “and the underlying 
concept has been deployed by judges in some of the most notorious Court opinions in American 
history, including the proslavery 1857 ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford”). 
 16. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. Chief Justice Taney stated that while the words “all men are 
created equal” in the Declaration of Independence “would seem to embrace the whole human 
family . . . it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be 
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration.” Id. at 410.  
 17. Id. at 407. 
 18. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of 
consideration.”19 Twining v. New Jersey,20 holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not make the privilege against self-incrimination 
applicable against the states, stated that what constitutes “due process 
of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages 
and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of 
England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have 
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted 
on by them after the settlement of this country.”21 In Twining, the Court 
concluded that the privilege was not established in English law “during 
the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative state and 
before it was incorporated in American constitutional law.”22 
Tradition was also referenced in Snyder v. Massachusetts,23 where 
the Court held that a defendant did not have a due process right to be 
present at a jury’s view of a crime scene. The state was “free to regulate 
the procedures of its courts in accordance with its own conception of 
policy and fairness unless in doing so it offends some principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.”24 A few years later, in Palko v. Connecticut,25 the Court 
held that the privilege against double jeopardy26 did not apply to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice 
Cardozo’s opinion for the Court concluded that due process protects 
only those rights making up “the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.”27 
Due process challenges to state regulation of education and 
parental control of children also faced unsuccessful tradition-based 
defenses. In Meyer v. Nebraska,28 the Court struck down a Nebraska 
statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to students who 
had not yet passed the eighth grade. Acknowledging that it had not 
precisely defined “liberty,” the Court determined that that term 
 
 19. Id. at 420–21. 
 20. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 21. Id. at 100. 
 22. Id. at 107. 
 23. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
 24. Id. at 105 (emphasis added). 
 25. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled in part by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 27. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, 326. 
 28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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included, among other things, the right “to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children.”29 It said: “The American people have always 
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of 
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.”30 A 
subsequent decision, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,31 applied Meyer in 
ruling that an Oregon statute requiring public school attendance by 
children between the ages of eight and sixteen “unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.”32 
Accordingly, a state could not “standardize its children by forcing them 
to accept instruction from public teachers only.”33 
B. The 1960s 
In the 1960s, the Court began to address the constitutionality of 
state laws regulating certain reproductive choices and practices. In Poe 
v. Ullman,34 the Court dismissed as not justiciable cases challenging a 
Connecticut statute making it a crime to use or give medical advice 
regarding the use of contraceptives. Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
influential dissent set out a balancing approach to be employed in 
determining whether an asserted liberty interest was a fundamental 
right protected by the Due Process Clause: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can 
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon the postulates 
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that 
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of 
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a 
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt 
free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The 
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having 
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it 
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That 
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically 
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds 
 
 29. Id. at 399. 
 30. Id. at 400. 
 31. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 32. Id. at 534–35. 
 33. Id. at 535. 
 34. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve 
as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.35 
Interestingly, Justice Harlan also observed that laws regarding 
marriage and “forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual 
practices . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our 
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon 
that basis.”36 
The Connecticut anti-use statute was again before the Court in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.37 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, 
held that the law unconstitutionally intruded on the right to marital 
privacy located in the “penumbras . . . formed by emanations from those 
guarantees” in the Bill of Rights “that help give them life and 
substance.”38 Marriage is “older than the Bill of Rights” and “is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, 
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. 
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.”39 A concurring Justice Goldberg, emphasizing the 
Ninth Amendment,40 observed that “judges are not left at large to 
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they 
must look to the ‘traditions and collective conscience of our people’ to 
determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted there . . . as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”41 Disagreeing with Justice Goldberg’s resort to 
tradition, a dissenting Justice Black, who found the Connecticut law 
“abhorrent, just viciously evil, but not unconstitutional,”42 stated that 
“the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget 
which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted” in 
the people’s conscience.43 It was not the Court’s duty “to keep the 
Constitution in tune with the times,”44 he argued, for those who made 
the Constitution “knew the need for change and provided for it” in 
 
 35. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 36. Id. at 546 (citation omitted). 
 37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 38. Id. at 484 (discussing marital privacy created and bound by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments). 
 39. Id. at 486; see also Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (stating that 
unmarried couples’ right to use contraceptives is protected by the Equal Protection Clause). 
 40. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (brackets omitted)). 
 42. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 557 (2d ed. 1997). 
 43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 522. 
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Article V.45 Justice Black said: “That method of change was good for 
our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add that it is 
good enough for me.”46 
Tradition and historical practices did not carry the day in the 
landmark Loving v. Virginia decision striking down state prohibition 
and criminalization of interracial marriages.47 In its oral argument to 
the Court, Virginia noted that “for over 100 years, since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, numerous states—as late as 1956, the 
majority of the states—and now even 16 states” prohibited interracial 
marriage with no question raised as to the state’s authority to do so.48 
That history-based plea was unavailing, as the Court held that the law 
at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause and deprived individuals 
of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. It held: “Under 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State.”49 
C. The 1970s 
In Roe v. Wade,50 the Court referenced history in invalidating a 
Texas criminal anti-abortion law. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the 
Court examined “[a]ncient attitudes,” the origins of the Hippocratic 
Oath, the common law, English statutory law, and state laws.51 He wrote 
that “[a]t common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, 
and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was 
viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently 
in effect.”52 A woman’s choice whether to terminate a pregnancy “was 
present in this country well into the 19th century,” Justice Blackmun 
wrote, and “[e]ven later, the law continued for some time to treat less 
punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.”53 Thus, he 
 
 45. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth procedures for the proposal and ratification 
of a constitutional amendment). 
 46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 47. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 48. Oral Argument, Loving v. Virginia (No. 395), in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975). 
 49. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 51. Id. at 130–41. 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Id. at 141. 
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concluded, the right to an abortion had not been traditionally 
proscribed. 
Dissenting, then-Justice Rehnquist grounded his argument in a 
different account of history and tradition. He argued that a half-century 
of restrictions on abortion in a majority of states was “a strong 
indication . . . that the asserted right to an abortion is not ‘so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”54 Looking to 1868, the year of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he noted that at least thirty-six state or 
territorial laws limited abortion; that the laws of twenty-one states in 
effect in 1868 were still in effect at the time of the Court’s 1973 decision; 
and that the at-issue Texas law was first enacted in 1857 and essentially 
the same law struck down by the Roe Court.55 Accordingly, in his view, 
prohibiting and criminalizing abortion was not unconstitutional 
because a number of states had prohibited the practice in the past. 
Tradition and the history of the family was also an important aspect 
of the Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a case 
involving a due process challenge to a city ordinance limiting the 
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single nuclear family.56 
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion acknowledged that in substantive due 
process cases, “there is reason for concern lest the only limits to . . . 
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at 
the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution 
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment . . . .”57 Focusing on 
tradition and the family, he observed that that tradition included 
nuclear families as well as extended families of “uncles, aunts, cousins, 
and especially grandparents sharing a household.”58 As those extended 
families were part of this nation’s traditions and were “equally 
deserving of constitutional protection,” the city could not 
constitutionally standardize adults and children “by forcing them to 
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.”59 
 
 54. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934)). 
 55. See id. at 175–77. 
 56. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). Inez Moore lived in her East Cleveland home 
with her son and two grandsons. The grandsons were first cousins and not brothers; one child 
came to live with Moore and her son and his child after the death of the child’s mother. See id. at 
496–97. 
 57. Id. at 502. 
 58. Id. at 504. 
 59. Id. at 505–06. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that the city 
had failed to explain the need for an ordinance that would have allowed the homeowner to live 
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Justice White, dissenting, criticized Justice Powell’s approach as 
suggesting “a far too expansive charter . . . . What the deeply rooted 
traditions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve the 
protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable.”60 In his 
view, the “Judiciary, including this Court[,] is the most vulnerable and 
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language 
or even the design of the Constitution.”61 Given that the Due Process 
Clause as presently constructed “represents a major judicial gloss on its 
terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers,” Justice White 
argued that the Court “should be extremely reluctant to breathe still 
further substantive content into” the clause in striking down welfare-
promoting legislative enactments adopted by a state or city.62 Doing so 
“unavoidably pre-empts” for the judiciary “another part of the 
governance of the country without express constitutional authority.”63 
D. The 1980s and 1990s 
In the 1980s, the Justices’ references to history and tradition were 
key aspects of a methodology known as legal traditionalism, the 
interpretation of the Constitution “in accordance with the long-
standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the 
nation.”64 A traditionalist “interpreter looks at what decentralized and 
representative bodies have done, over time, and treats their consensus 
as authoritative . . . . [U]nless the text and history of the Constitution 
are clear, judges should defer to the decisions of present-day 
representative institutions.”65 Consider the legal traditionalist 
 
with her grandchildren if they were brothers but not if they were cousins. See id. at 520 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in the judgment). Absent any showing of the ordinance’s substantial relation to the 
city’s public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the law could not deprive Moore of a 
fundamental right typically associated with the ownership of residential property: the right to 
decide who may reside at that property. See id.  
 60. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 544. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1133 (1998). 
 65. Id. at 1136. Traditionalism is distinct from and should not be confused with another 
interpretive methodology, originalism, a family of constitutional theories unified by the fixation 
thesis (“the original meaning of constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision was 
framed, ratified, and made public”), and the constraint principle (“constitutional practice should 
be constrained by this fixed original meaning”). Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living 
Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243,     
1265–66 (2019). Originalism’s focus on fixed meaning thus differs from evolutionary 
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approach and application in three significant substantive due process 
cases. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick,66 a five-Justice majority held that a Georgia 
anti-sodomy law as applied to two men did not violate the Due Process 
Clause. Justice White’s majority opinion asked the following question: 
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of 
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a 
very long time.”67 Answering “no,” Justice White looked to and relied 
on the “ancient roots” of prohibitions of “homosexual sodomy”; 
common law criminalization of sodomy; laws prohibiting sodomy in the 
thirteen original states ratifying the Bill of Rights in 1791; criminal 
sodomy laws in effect in 32 of the 37 states when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868; the proscription of sodomy in all fifty 
states prior to 1961, the year in which Illinois decriminalized consensual 
and private sexual conduct between adults; and the fact that at the time 
of the Court’s 1986 decision, twenty-four states and the District of 
Columbia criminalized sodomy performed in private and between 
consenting adults.68 Justice White concluded that “[a]gainst this 
background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition or implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty is, at best, facetious.”69 Rejecting this traditionalist 
approach and conclusion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the 
Court’s prior rulings made clear that the fact that a state traditionally 
viewed a specific practice as immoral was not sufficient grounds for 
forbidding the practice; “neither history nor tradition could save a law 
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”70 
Subsequently, the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.71 held that a 
California law presuming that a child born to a married woman was a 
 
traditionalism “which draws its normative authority” from historical practice. John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
& Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
1211, 1241 (1998).   
 66. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 67. Id. at 190. 
 68. Id. at 192–94. 
 69. Id. at 194 (quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, concurring, stated 
that the condemnation of homosexual conduct was “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and 
ethical standards.” Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). “To hold that the act of homosexual 
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral 
teaching.” Id. at 197. 
 70. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 216 n.9 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967)) (noting that “miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy”). 
 71. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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child of the marriage did not violate the due process rights of the child’s 
biological father, who was not married to the mother and sought 
parental and visitation rights. Writing for a plurality of the Court, 
Justice Antonin Scalia declared that the purpose of the Due Process 
Clause “is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside 
important traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new 
ones.”72 He asked whether the relationship between the biological 
father and the child “had been treated as a protected family unit under 
the historic practices of our society, or whether on any basis it has been 
accorded special protection” and thought “it impossible to find that it 
has.”73 In Justice Scalia’s view, the pertinent tradition recognizing the 
common law presumption of legitimacy was found in a 1569 book 
written by Bracton, in Blackstone’s and Kent’s respective 
commentaries, and in a 1957 American Law Reports annotation on the 
presumption of the legitimacy of children conceived and born in 
wedlock.74 
As Michael H. asserted the right to a judicial declaration that he 
was the natural father of the child and sought to obtain parental 
prerogatives, Justice Scalia instructed that the father had to establish, 
“not that our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his 
circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally 
accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not traditionally 
denied them.”75 For Scalia, it was “ultimately irrelevant” that then-
extant law in a number of states appeared to allow the natural father a 
theoretical power to rebut the marital presumption.76 Not aware of a 
single case awarding substantive parental rights to the natural father 
conceived in and born into a marital unit embracing the child, Justice 
Scalia concluded: “This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights 
qualifying as liberty interests are made.”77 
 
 72. Id. at 122 n.2. 
 73. Id. at 124. 
 74. See id. at 124–26 and sources cited. Responding to Justice Scalia’s identification of the 
pertinent tradition, Justice Brennan argued that accord on that point would require agreement 
with regard to when “a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty 
and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.” Id. at 138 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan argued that “it would be comforting to believe that a 
search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through 
dusty volumes on American history”; he “would not stop . . . at Bracton, or Blackstone, or Kent, 
or even the American Law Reports . . .” Id. at 137.  
 75. Id. at 126. 
 76. Id. at 127. 
 77. Id. 
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In a footnote joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia 
set out a methodology governing the identification of the pertinent 
tradition in due process cases: “We refer to the most specific level at 
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the 
asserted right can be identified.”78 Citing Bowers v. Hardwick,79 he 
argued that this methodology was not novel, and that consulting the 
most specific tradition was necessary to avoid the “imprecise guidance” 
of general traditions that would allow judges to dictate and not discern 
society’s views.80 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, declined to adopt this approach, arguing that it “sketche[d] a 
mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause . . . that may be somewhat 
inconsistent with our past decisions in this area.”81 Citing Loving v. 
Virginia82 and other Court decisions, Justice O’Connor argued that in 
those cases the Court characterized rights-protecting traditions “at 
levels of generality that might not be the most specific level 
available.”83 Citing Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman dissent,84 she did not 
“foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode 
of historical analysis.”85 
The Due Process Clause, as interpreted by the Court in Bowers and 
Michael H., was grounded in not only decades-old but centuries-old 
views and positions applied to twentieth-century claims of individual 
rights. Given the traditionalist methodology employed in those 
decisions, modern-day challenges to certain governmental restrictions 
on individuals’ actions and conduct would fall and fail in the face of 
Court-determined history and tradition. 
The Court took an anti-traditionalist turn, however, in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.86 Reaffirming the 
central holding of Roe v. Wade,87 the Justices again discussed whether 
and how tradition should be considered and used in deciding 
substantive due process cases. A joint opinion for a plurality of the 
 
 78. Id. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 80. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 81. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 83. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 84. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 85. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Court, authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
responded to Justice Scalia’s Michael H. call for referring to the most 
specific level at which a tradition protecting or denying protection to a 
claimed right can be identified.88 In their view, it is “tempting . . . to 
suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, 
defined at the most specific level, that were protected against 
government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified . . . . But such a view would be inconsistent 
with our law.”89 Citing the Ninth Amendment, the joint opinion stated: 
“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer 
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects.”90 
Grounding its analysis in Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent,91 the joint 
opinion remarked that the “inescapable fact is that adjudication of 
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting 
the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition 
courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are 
not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.”92 Prior Court decisions 
protecting individuals’ “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, children rearing, and 
education”93 involved “the most intimate and personal choices a person 
 
 88. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 89. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (joint opinion) (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127–28 n.6 (opinion 
of Scalia, J.)). 
 90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848; see also id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (stating that liberty should not be determined on the 
basis of state practices existing at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (joint opinion). In his 2006 book, then-Judge and now-Justice Neil 
Gorsuch commented on the difficulties of the “reasoned judgment” test: 
Are judges any more competent at the task (or deserving of any more deference) than 
legislators? How does substantive due process doctrine differ from outright judicial 
choice, or what is sometimes derisively labeled “legislation from the bench”? How 
many moral philosophers actually agree, after all, about what metaphysical imperatives 
such as “autonomy” entail? One might even ask whether it is bold enough to hold that 
the procedurally oriented language of the due process guarantee contains the 
enumerated substantive rights of the Bill of Rights; does going any further—holding 
that the clause is also the repository of other substantive rights not expressly 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution or its amendments, and thus entirely 
dependent for their legitimacy solely on the “reasoned judgment” of five judges—
stretch the clause beyond recognition? 
NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 77 (2006). 
 93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  
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may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy,” and 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.94 
This tradition—the reasoned judgment of courts considering this 
conception of liberty—is antithetical to the traditionalist 
methodologies of Bowers and Michael H. 
Reiterating the historical analysis of the abortion rights issue set 
out in his Roe dissent,95 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that “it can 
scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively 
unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification of the 
right to abortion as ‘fundamental’ under the Due Process Clause.”96 
And Justice Scalia rejected the joint opinion’s reasoned judgment 
approach and conception of liberty as protecting intimate and personal 
choices central to an individual’s dignity and autonomy. Citing Bowers 
v. Hardwick,97 he argued that the same judgment could be applied to 
same-sex sexual intimacies, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, “all of 
which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is our 
unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable. It is 
not reasoned judgment that supports the Court’s decision; only 
personal predilection.”98 The “American people love democracy and 
the American people are not fools,” Justice Scalia opined, and as long 
they and the Court thought that the Justices were doing “essentially 
lawyers’ work” the “public pretty much left us alone.”99 But if the 
Court’s adjudication process is primarily one of making value 
judgments and ignoring a “long and clear tradition clarifying an 
ambiguous text,” “then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards 
us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different.”100 
 
 94. Id.   
 95. See id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); supra 
note 54 and accompanying text. 
 96. Id. at 952–53. 
 97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  
 99. Id. at 1000. 
 100. Id. at 1000–01. 
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II. REJECTING POE: WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG 
As just discussed, Casey embraced Justice Harlan’s Poe balancing 
approach and called for the Court’s reasoned judgment in its 
interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause. Five years 
later, a majority of the Court employed a different historical and 
formulaic substantive due process analysis in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.101 
The Glucksberg Court addressed the question of whether a 
Washington state statute prohibiting a person from knowingly causing 
or aiding another person to attempt suicide102 violated a mentally 
competent, terminally ill adult’s right to commit suicide with the 
assistance of a physician. Applying what is now known as the 
“Glucksberg Two-Step,”103 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) 
considered two primary features of what the Chief Justice called the 
Court’s “established” substantive due process methodology.104 First, the 
Due Process Clause “protects those fundamental rights and liberties 
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither his liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”105 
Second, the Court requires a “careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.”106 An asserted right satisfying both 
prongs of the test is deemed a fundamental right triggering strict 
scrutiny judicial review; a claimed right not meeting the test is subject 
to deferential rational-basis review. 
Considering first the “careful description” prong of the Glucksberg 
analysis, Rehnquist noted that those challenging the Washington law 
asserted a “liberty to choose how to die,” a right to “control of one’s 
final days,” “the right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the 
liberty to shape death.”107 Rejecting those descriptions of the claimed 
 
 101. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1). 
 103. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1488 (2008).  
 104. Glucksberg, 512 U.S. at 703. 
 105. Id. at 721 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 192, 194 (1986) (concluding that an asserted “fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in 
acts of consensual sodomy” was “facetious” as it was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition” and was not “implicit in the concept or ordered liberty”), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 106. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quotation marks omitted). 
 107. Id. at 722. 
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liberty interest, he instead framed the question as “whether the ‘liberty’ 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”108 
Turning to the Bowers-like history-and-tradition prong of the 
Glucksberg test, Rehnquist concluded that (his framing of) the at-issue 
right did not have “any place in our Nation’s traditions.”109 He noted 
that “for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition 
has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisted 
suicide”;110 the American colonies and early states prohibited assisted 
suicide as did most states when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1868;111 and in recent years states had reexamined and 
generally reaffirmed assisted suicide proscriptions.112 Given this 
“consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the 
asserted right and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for 
terminally ill, mentally competent adults,” the Chief Justice concluded 
that invalidating the Washington statute would “reverse centuries of 
legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State.”113 Accordingly, the claimed right was not 
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition and was therefore 
“not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”114 
Rehnquist then concluded that the Washington statute survived 
rational-basis review because it was reasonably related to the following 
state interests: preserving human life; protecting the medical 
profession’s integrity and ethics; protecting the poor, the elderly, and 
the disabled from abuse and neglect; and avoiding the risk that 
permitting assisted suicide could be a pathway to both voluntary and 
involuntary euthanasia.115 The Court therefore held that Washington’s 
physician-assisted suicide ban did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment on its face or as applied to competent and terminally ill 
 
 108. Id. at 723. Formulating a different inquiry, a concurring Justice David H. Souter, relying 
on Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent, framed the pertinent question as whether the challenged law “sets 
up one of those ‘arbitrary impositions’ or ‘purposeless restraints’ at odds with the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 109. Id. at 723 (majority opinion). 
 110. Id. at 711. 
 111. See id. at 714–15. 
 112. See id. at 716. 
 113. Id. at 723. 
 114. Id. at 728. 
 115. See id. at 728–35. 
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adults seeking death-hastening medications prescribed by their 
doctors.116 
The history-and tradition methodology employed in Glucksberg is 
fundamentally different from Casey’s balancing/reasoned judgment 
analysis. The approach is so different that scholars plausibly argued at 
that time that Glucksberg repudiated Casey’s methodology and 
assumed the mantle of the controlling authority in subsequent 
substantive due process cases.117 
III. LAWRENCE’S MOVE AWAY FROM, AND MCDONALD’S RETURN 
TO, GLUCKSBERG 
A. Lawrence v. Texas 
The view that due process traditionalist analysis governed the 
Court’s interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause in 
substantive due process cases was not followed in Lawrence v. Texas.118 
There, the Court held that a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate 
sexual conduct engaged in by two persons of the same sex violated the 
Due Process Clause. Writing for the Lawrence Court and opening his 
opinion with his conception of “liberty,”119 Justice Kennedy did not ask 
the question posed by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick: “whether the 
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many States that 
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”120 
He instead asked whether individuals “were free as adults to engage in 
the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”121 
 
 116. See id. at 735.  
 117. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove 
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1557–60 (2000) (noting that 
Glucksberg effectively renders the Casey framework unpersuasive).  
 118. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 119. See id. at 562. Kennedy wrote: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or 
other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And 
there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State 
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its 
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions. 
 120. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see also supra note 67 and 
accompanying text.  
 121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (Bowers’s framing of the Court’s inquiry “discloses the Court’s 
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Deeming it necessary to reconsider Bowers’s holding and making no 
mention of Glucksberg—in which he joined the majority opinion in 
full122—Justice Kennedy disagreed with Bowers’s conclusion that anti-
sodomy laws have “‘ancient roots.’”123 Finding “no longstanding history 
in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct 
matter,” he held that “early American sodomy laws were not directed 
at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative 
sexual activity more generally.”124 
Justice Kennedy then employed a desuetude analysis125 and found 
significant the absence of a record of enforcement of anti-sodomy laws 
against consenting adults privately engaging in such conduct. As the 
infrequency of prosecutions “ma[de] it difficult to say that society 
approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment” of the conduct, the 
longstanding criminalization of homosexual sodomy relied upon in 
Bowers “[wa]s as consistent with a general condemnation of 
nonprocreative sex as it [wa]s with an established tradition of 
prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.”126 Moreover, 
state-law criminalization of same-sex intimate conduct did not occur 
until the 1970s, with nine states prohibiting same-sex sexual relations 
and five of those states later abolishing the proscription.127 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers 
are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring 
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are 
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”128 
Having questioned the accuracy of Bowers’s historical account, 
Justice Kennedy turned to Bowers’s traditionalist analysis. He did not 
look back, as did the Bowers Court, to colonial times, 1791, 1868, or 
 
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” and “demeans the claim that the individual 
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is simply 
about the right to have sexual intercourse”); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 567. 
 122. See Kenji Yoshino, Comment, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (2015) (noting that the Court ought to have proclaimed that Bowers 
was wrongly decided and did so in Glucksberg).  
 123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192). 
 124. Id. at 568. 
 125. On desuetude, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT 109 (1999) (“Citizens may not be prosecuted under laws that that were 
enforced long ago, are regularly violated in practice, and are invoked only on a sporadic and 
highly selective basis . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?: Of Autonomy, 
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27–28 (2003).  
 126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570. 
 127. See id. at 570–71. 
 128. Id. at 571. 
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other time periods. In his view, the appropriate temporal period was 
“our laws and traditions of the past half century,” and he found therein 
“an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”129 He believed that “[h]istory and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive 
due process inquiry.”130 Justice Kennedy opined that the 
aforementioned emerging awareness was evidenced by, among other 
things, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, a 1981 
European Court of Human Rights decision holding that laws 
prohibiting same-sex sexual intimacy violated the European 
Convention on Human Rights,131 and the post-Bowers reduction in the 
number of anti-sodomy state laws from twenty-five to thirteen, with 
four states specifically forbidding homosexual sodomy.132 
For the foregoing and other reasons, Justice Kennedy concluded, 
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. 
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should 
be and now is overruled.”133 In so concluding, he noted that the case 
before the Court did not involve minors or persons injured, coerced, or 
in relationships in which consent could not be easily refused, or 
prostitution or public conduct.134 Nor did the case involve the question 
“whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”135 As the Texas 
statute furthered no legitimate state interest justifying intrusion into 
the individual’s person and private life, the Court invalidated the law. 
Justice Kennedy closed his opinion with the following observation: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the 
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have 
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They 
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can 
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact only serve 
 
 129. Id. at 572. 
 130. Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). 
 131. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 52 (1981). 
 132. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573; see also id. at 572–73 (referring to the British Parliament 
committee’s 1963 Wolfenden Report recommending the repeal of laws punishing homosexual 
conduct and the enactment of the recommendations’ substance in 1967).  
 133. Id. at 578. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation 
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.136 
In overruling Bowers, Justice Kennedy did not mention Glucksberg, 
which was an interesting omission given that Glucksberg employed the 
same history-and-tradition methodology used in the interred Bowers. 
Furthermore, Lawrence did employ its own backward-looking 
approach, focusing on the half century preceding the Court’s decision 
in which the Court found an “emerging awareness” that 
constitutionally protected liberty includes adults’ decisions about their 
private sexual lives.137 What was constitutionally permissible in 1986—
the criminalization of private same-sex sexual intimacies—was 
constitutionally impermissible in 2003. 
A vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that liberty was constrained by 
the Texas law and by “laws prohibiting prostitution, recreational use of 
heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60 hours per week in a 
bakery.”138 That restraint of liberty was not problematic, he argued, as 
the state may deprive persons of liberty through the due process of 
law.139 Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s substantive due process 
doctrine prohibits state infringement of fundamental liberty interests 
unless that interest is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest. Under Glucksberg, “only fundamental rights 
qualify for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protection—that is, 
rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”140 Adhering to Bowers’ history-and-tradition analysis, 
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Kennedy’s emerging awareness approach 
and focus on the half-century preceding the Lawrence decision. An 
“‘emerging awareness’ does not establish a ‘fundamental right,’” he 
argued, and “is by definition not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and traditions . . . Constitutional entitlements do not spring into 
existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal 
sanctions on certain behavior.”141 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra note 129 129and accompanying text.  
 138. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referencing the more than sixty working hour per week 
restriction at issue in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 139. See id.  
 140. Id. at 593 (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 478 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)).   
 141. Id. at 598 (brackets omitted). 
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Justice Scalia also responded to Justice Kennedy’s statement that 
Lawrence did not involve the question whether any relationship 
entered into by homosexual persons had to be formally recognized by 
government:142 
Do not believe it . . . . Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made 
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned . . . . This case “does not 
involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the 
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions 
of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures 
us, this is so.143 
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
So, did Glucksberg survive Lawrence? In McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, the Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms, recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller,144 is fully 
applicable to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause.145 Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,146 quoted Glucksberg and answered in 
the affirmative the question whether the right to keep and bear arms 
was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”147 Alito 
wrote that “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal 
systems from ancient times to the present day,”148 and Heller makes it 
clear that this is a historical and traditional right.149 
Justice Alito traced the origins of the claimed right from the 1689 
English Bill of Rights to Blackstone’s 1765 assertion that “the right to 
keep and bear arms was ‘one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen’” 
to the American colonies.150 The right “was considered no less 
fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights,” with 
 
 142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 144. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 145. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (ruling that Heller “unmistakably” 
suggests that the right to bear arms is binding on the states via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
 146. Id. at 748.  
 147. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 148. Id. at 768 (footnote omitted). 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id.  
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nine states adopting state constitutional provisions protecting the 
individual right to keep and bear arms between 1789 and 1820, joining 
four other states that adopted Second Amendment analogues prior to 
ratification of the Bill of Rights.151 Justice Alito’s opinion continued 
into the 1850s, past the Civil War and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 
1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to the proposed and ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment.152 In 1868, the year of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “22 of the 37 States in the Union had state 
constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and 
bear arms,” as did state constitutions adopted during Reconstruction 
by former states of the Confederacy.153 “In sum,” Justice Alito 
concluded, “it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”154 Per 
Glucksberg, he examined what he determined to be the relevant and 
deeply rooted tradition and history in answering the due process 
question presented in McDonald. 
In the almost twenty-five years beginning with Bowers and ending 
with McDonald, the Court (1) employed a traditionalist methodology 
in rejecting a substantive due process challenge to the criminalization 
of same-sex sexual conduct (Bowers); (2) declared that the outer limits 
of the substantive sphere of liberty were not marked by the Bill of 
Rights or by state practices at the time of the 1868 ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Casey); (3) looked to and relied on state 
practices when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified as part of a 
Bowers-like history-and-tradition approach in rejecting a substantive 
due process challenge to a prohibition of physician-assisted suicide 
(Glucksberg); (4) overruled Bowers in another case involving the 
constitutionality of state criminalization of same-sex sexual intimacies 
(Lawrence); and (5) cited Glucksberg and employed the history-and-
tradition methodology in holding that the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms for purposes of self-defense was incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment (McDonald). 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in the non-
traditionalist Casey and Lawrence decisions, yet also in the 
traditionalist Glucksberg and McDonald rulings. Given those votes, 
 
 151. Id. at 768–69. 
 152. See id. at 770–77. 
 153. Id. at 777. 
 154. Id. at 778. 
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how Justice Kennedy would treat and what he would say about 
Glucksberg in the Court’s marriage equality decision were important 
matters of legal and public interest. 
IV. OBERGEFELL 
In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,155 the Supreme 
Court held that state laws banning marriage between persons of the 
same sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.156 
In so holding, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a five-Justice majority 
(joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) departed from Glucksberg’s history-
and-tradition approach. 
Recall that the first Glucksberg prong determines the issue of the 
fundamentality of an asserted liberty interest by reference to the 
nation’s deeply rooted history and traditions.157 Not using that 
approach, Justice Kennedy, quoting Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman 
dissent, observed that the “identification and protection of 
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret 
the Constitution. That responsibility, however, ‘has not been reduced to 
any formula.’”158 “History and tradition guide and discipline this 
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries,” Justice Kennedy 
continued, and respecting and learning from history does not mean that 
“the past alone . . . rule[s] the present.”159 In a passage similar to one he 
wrote in Lawrence,160 Justice Kennedy wrote: 
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own 
times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of 
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all to enjoy liberty as 
we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the 
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a 
claim to liberty must be addressed.161 
 
 155. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 156. The Court also held that laws prohibiting same-sex couples’ right to marry “abridge 
central precepts of equality” and violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2604. 
 157. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 158. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 161. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.  
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This due process approach entrusting to future generations the task of 
determining the meaning of “liberty” in their own times is the antithesis 
of “liberty” defined and cabined by Glucksberg’s formulaic history-
and-tradition approach. 
Justice Kennedy then addressed the respondents’ argument that 
Glucksberg’s “careful description” prong required framing the 
petitioners’ claim as one seeking not the right to marry, but “a new and 
nonexistent ‘right to same-sex marriage.’”162 He conceded that 
Glucksberg had called for a circumscribed definition of liberty in the 
context of the right to physician-assisted suicide asserted in that case. 
While that approach “may have been appropriate”163 in analyzing that 
issue, “it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in 
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and 
intimacy.”164 Loving v. Virginia165 concerned marriage, not interracial 
marriage; Turner v. Safley166 marriage, not inmates’ right to marry; and 
Zablocki v. Redhail167 marriage, not a father with unpaid child support’s 
right to marry. In each of those cases, the Court considered the “right 
to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient 
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”168 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear his view that the past did 
not control the Court’s 2015 consideration and resolution of the same-
sex marriage issue. “If rights were defined by those who exercised them 
in the past,” he wrote, “then received practices could serve as their own 
continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once 
denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect to the 
right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.”169 While the right to 
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, “rights come 
not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed 
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that 
remains urgent in our own era.”170 Kennedy believed that in this era, at 
this time, the right to marry was a fundamental right, and states that 
 
 162. Id. at 2602 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 8, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (No. 14-556)). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 166. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 167. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. 
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deprive same-sex couples of that liberty violate the Due Process 
Clause.171 
Dissenting Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, remarked that “for millennia and across civilizations[,]” 
marriage referred to the union of a man and a woman, and that at the 
time of the nation’s founding marriage was understood as a voluntary 
compact between husband and wife.172 The Framers entrusted to the 
states the subject of husband-wife domestic relations, every state 
defined marriage “in the traditional, biological way,” and nineteenth-
century dictionaries and early Court opinions defined marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman.173 
Emphasizing the “need for restraint in administering the strong 
medicine of substantive due process,” Chief Justice Roberts cited two 
Court decisions as exemplars of the Court exceeding its judicial role. 
First, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,174 the Court acted on its conceptions of 
liberty and property in invalidating the Missouri Compromise. And 
Lochner v. New York175 struck down a New York law establishing 
maximum hours for bakery employees because the Court saw “no 
reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate 
as a health law.”176 The Chief Justice stated that Dred Scott’s holding 
and approach177 “was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and 
by constitutional amendment after Appomattox,” only to reappear in 
Lochner before the Court eventually recognized its error of 
“converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates” and 
discarded the doctrine.178 
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts complained that Obergefell 
effectively overruled Glucksberg, “the leading modern case setting the 
bounds of substantive due process.”179 In so doing, he argued, the Court 
employed the discredited Lochner methodology in an opinion 
 
 171. See id. at 2604. 
 172. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 2614. 
 174. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 175. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 176. Id. at 58. 
 177. In the view of one writer, Chief Justice Roberts suggested “that the majority in Obergefell 
was imposing its own view of liberty on the American people” just as Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
Dred Scott opinion “imposed his view of slavery. He implied that Obergefell was just as 
egregious.” JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE 
JOHN ROBERTS 300 (2019). 
 178. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617, 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 2621. 
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“rest[ing] on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that 
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and 
that it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to 
deny them this right.”180 Equating that conclusion with the “naked 
policy preferences adopted in Lochner,” the Chief Justice wrote that 
the majority’s approach “is dangerous for the rule of law . . . . The Court 
today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but 
actively repudiates it, preferring to live in the heady days of the here 
and now.”181 In his view, an immodest and unrestrained Court was 
insufficiently sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and 
unaccountable, and are not “attuned to the lessons of history” and what 
it means when judges exceed their appropriate bounds.182 Like judges, 
a pretentious “present generation” has supposed that they “are the 
ones chosen to burst the bonds” of “thousands of years” of the 
traditional institution of marriage.183 
V. GLUCKSBERG, POST-OBERGEFELL 
As previously noted, Chief Justice Roberts argued that Obergefell 
effectively overruled Glucksberg, “the leading modern case setting the 
bounds of substantive due process.”184 Noting the Chief Justice’s 
observation on this point, Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that 
“[a]fter Obergefell, it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg as 
binding precedent” and that Obergefell “seems to have laid waste to 
the entire Glucksberg edifice.”185 Agreeing with Professor Yoshino, 
Professor Laurence Tribe has written that Obergefell “has definitively 
replaced” the Glucksberg test “with the more holistic inquiry of Justice 
Harlan’s justly famous 1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman . . . .”186 However, 
as previously noted, in 2017 then-Judge and now-Justice Kavanaugh 
expressed a different view regarding Glucksberg’s post-Obergefell 
 
 180. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 181. Id. at 2621, 2622–23. 
 182. Id. at 2626. 
 183. Id. In a separate dissent, Justice Alito, quoting Glucksberg, argued that to “prevent five 
unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the American people, the 
Court has held that ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only 
those rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).   
 184. Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 185. Yoshino, supra note 122, at 162, 166. 
 186. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 16 
(2015); see also Alexis M. Piazza, The Right to Education After Obergefell, 43 HARBINGER 62 
(Apr. 2, 2019) (noting although Obergefell did not expressly overrule Glucksberg, “there is little 
doubt that [Glucksberg] rests on fragile ground”). 
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status, remarking that to the then-present day Glucksberg is an 
important precedent ensuring that the Court operates as a court of law 
and not as an institution of social policy.187 
Those views raise an important question: did Glucksberg survive 
Obergefell? In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy reasoned that while 
Glucksberg may have been appropriate in the physician-assisted 
suicide context in which it was applied, it was inconsistent with the 
approach taken by the Court in substantive due process cases involving 
marriage and intimacy.188 Under that view, Obergefell did not expressly 
overrule Glucksberg, leaving the Court’s 1997 decision in the physician-
assisted-suicide jurisprudential and precedential silo. But aspects of the 
Obergefell majority opinion could be read and understood as rejecting 
Glucksberg’s formulaic fundamental rights analysis. For instance, 
Justice Kennedy declared that history and tradition guide, but do not 
set, the outer boundaries of the Court’s substantive due process 
methodology and recognized—indeed endorsed—the need for and 
propriety of generational determinations of the meaning of “liberty.” 
Whether and to what extent Glucksberg lives post-Obergefell is an 
open question awaiting future Court analysis and resolution. In the 
meantime, one can look to post-Obergefell lower court decisions for 
guidance. For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Reyna v. Hott189 considered 
plaintiffs’ argument that their asserted substantive due process right to 
family unity precluded Immigration and Customs Enforcement from 
transferring parents from a facility near their children to one farther 
away. While the plaintiffs relied on Obergefell as support for their 
position, the court did not agree. Finding no precedent recognizing the 
asserted right and citing Glucksberg, the court concluded that it “was 
hardly free to create a new substantive due process right . . . .”190 The 
court thus declined to recognize the claimed right in the absence of 
objective criteria for assessing the strength of family ties, as the 
enforcement of such a right would rest upon the subjective judgments 
of judges, “just the circumstance about which the Supreme Court 
advised utmost caution in Glucksberg.”191 
 
 187. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
 189. 921 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 190. Id. at 211. 
 191. Id. 
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Another Fourth Circuit decision, D.B. v. Cardall,192 held that the 
federal Office of Refugee Settlement’s refusal to release a child to his 
mother’s custody because it deemed her incapable of providing for the 
child’s physical and mental well-being did not violate the mother’s 
substantive due process rights. Acknowledging Obergefell’s statement 
that the identification of rights implicating substantive due process 
“has not been reduced to any formula,”193 the court opined that, at a 
minimum, rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
are included.194 The denial of the mother’s custody request based on the 
determination that she was incapable of caring for the child did not 
deprive her of a deeply rooted right and fundamental liberty interest.195 
In Parrino v. Price,196 the Sixth Circuit rejected a pharmacist’s 
substantive due process claim against the federal government. The 
pharmacist pled guilty to the crime of introducing misbranded drugs 
into interstate commerce and was excluded from participation in 
federal health programs for at least five years.197 The pharmacist alleged 
that the exclusion deprived him of a protected liberty interest in his 
good name and reputation protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.198 Relying on Glucksberg, the Sixth Circuit stated that 
substantive due process “protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”199 The 
pharmacist had no fundamental right to participate in the programs.200 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected a substantive due process claim in 
another case which involved claims that individuals’ inclusion on a 
government list designating them for enhanced security screening 
before they were allowed to board flights infringed their fundamental 
rights to travel and harmed their reputations.201 Again citing 
 
 192. 826 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 193. Id. at 740 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598). 
 194. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). 
 195. Id. at 741; see also Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs. of Jefferson Cty., 732 F. App’x 624 
(10th Cir. 2018) (asserting plaintiff’s right to be free from pretrial detention after paying a 
required bond and waiting to be fit with a GPS monitor was not deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and tradition and was therefore not a fundamental liberty interest). 
 196. 869 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 197. Id. at 395. 
 198. Id. at 396; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791) (“No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 199. Parrino, 869 F.3d at 397 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 F.3d at 720–21). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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Glucksberg and quoting the Court’s deeply rooted in history and 
tradition language, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to 
adequately allege a violation of their fundamental rights.202 
In another post-Obergefell case, Aka v. United States Tax Court,203 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that a decision to disbar the 
plaintiff without evidence that he had committed a crime did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Approvingly citing 
Glucksberg, the court opined, “substantive due process protects 
‘fundamental’ liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ . . . Under 
this banner, the Supreme Court has protected certain interests related 
to sexuality, marriage, and family life,”204 including a same-sex couple’s 
right to marry.205 The court found it “impossible to wrench from these 
cases a substantive due process right to bar membership or against 
unduly harsh disbarment.”206 Thus, Glucksberg survived Obergefell. 
A recent district court decision citing Obergefell, Duffner v. City of 
St. Peters,207 nonetheless relied on Glucksberg in concluding that 
plaintiffs challenging an ordinance requiring residents to plant and 
maintain turf grass on their private property failed to identify a 
fundamental right restricted by the ordinance.208 And in Struniak v. 
Lynch,209 the Eastern District of Virginia observed that Obergefell’s 
methodology is “properly understood as a rejection of the strict 
requirements of Glucksberg and an embrace of Justice Harlan’s 
common law approach to implied fundamental liberty interests.”210 
Determining that Obergefell did not expressly overrule Glucksberg, the 
court applied both decisions in analyzing the plaintiff’s argument that 
 
 202. Id. at 466–67.  
 203. 854 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 204. Id. at 34 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21). 
 205. Id. at 35 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599). 
 206. Id.; see also Van Orden v. Stringer, 937 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Glucksberg and 
holding that plaintiffs’ contention that they were entitled to changes in the way state officials 
conducted annual reviews of civilly-committed persons was not deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty); Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 
1283 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting prisoner did not have a protected liberty interest in not being 
classified as a sex offender; per Glucksberg, the claimed right to refuse registration was not deeply 
rooted); Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Glucksberg and 
concluding that history and tradition did not provide a firm footing for a taxpayer’s claimed 
deduction for the costs of in vitro fertilization procedures, a “decidedly modern phenomena”).  
 207. Duffner v. City of St. Peters, No. 4:16-CV-01971, 2018 WL 1519378 at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
28, 2018), aff’d, 930 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 208. Id.  
 209. 159 F. Supp. 3d 643 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
 210. Id. at 667. 
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a citizen has a constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable 
liberty interest in residing in the United States with his or her non-
citizen spouse.211 Under Glucksberg, “the analysis is simple and 
straightforward . . . the nation’s history and traditions establish the 
power of Congress to restrict immigrant presence in the United States 
even when the immigrant is married to a United States citizen.”212 
Under Obergefell, “the analysis is not much more difficult . . . the 
Glucksberg analysis remains relevant, and the long history of 
congressional regulation bears due consideration,” as does the absence 
of a “history of impermissible animus as the basis for the restriction at 
issue here.”213 Accordingly, the court held, the plaintiff did not have a 
judicially protected or enforceable fundamental liberty interest.214 
An Obergefellian approach to a Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process suit was on display in the District of Oregon’s decision in 
Juliana v. United States.215 The court considered whether environmental 
activists who were too young to vote had a fundamental liberty interest 
in a climate system capable of sustaining human life.216 Noting 
Glucksberg’s history and tradition inquiry, the court nonetheless relied 
on Obergefell’s generational liberty approach217 in concluding that 
“‘new’ fundamental rights are [not] out of bounds.”218 Exercising its 
“reasoned judgment,” the court had “no doubt that the right to a 
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a 
free and ordered society. Just as marriage is the ‘foundation of the 
family,’ a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation of 
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.”219 Thus, the court held, 
where a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and 
substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause 
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread 
damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically 
alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process 
violation. To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 667–68 (citation omitted). 
 213. Id. at 668. 
 214. Id. 
 215. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Ore. 2016), rev’d for lack of standing and remanded for 
dismissal, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 216. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234. 
 217. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 218. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249. 
 219. Id. at 1250 (quotation marks omitted). 
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affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to 
poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink. 
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged infringement of a fundamental 
right.220 
Although reversed on appeal for lack of standing,221 the court’s 
decision is an interesting exemplar of the application of a generational 
liberty analysis going beyond the Glucksberg approach. 
Consider an additional post-Obergefell decision by the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico involving the same issue of physician-assisted 
suicide taken up by the Glucksberg Court in 1997. In Morris v. 
Brandenburg,222 the court considered a declaratory judgment action 
brought by physicians and a patient challenging the constitutionality of 
a New Mexico statute criminalizing assisted suicide.223 As framed by the 
court, the “question in this case is whether a mentally competent, 
terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to have a willing 
physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe 
medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of 
peacefully ending the patient’s life.”224 “No,” answered the court, 
holding that physician assistance in dying is not a fundamental or 
 
 220. Id. For additional post-Obergefell federal decisions court decisions discussing 
Glucksberg, see Students & Parents for Privacy v. Sch. Dirs. of Township High Sch. Dist. 211, 377 
F. Supp. 3d 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (noting Obergefell but relying on Glucksberg in holding that 
students’ claimed right not to be seen unclothed by the opposite sex was not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 363 (E.D. 
Mich. 2018) (holding that minor children’s allegations that inadequate public schools denied them 
access to literacy because of their race did not violate the Due Process Clause; although noting 
Obergefell’s “reasoned judgment” analysis, the court concluded that “in a case like this one, the 
holding of Obergefell does not counsel a departure from” the Glucksberg approach); Ammarell 
v. United States, No. 3:16-CV-00708, 2018 WL 2843441 (W.D.N.C. June 11, 2018) (noting North 
Carolina tort claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation passed constitutional 
muster; Glucksberg’s history-and-tradition analysis was not altered by Lawrence v. Texas, and the 
alleged sexual conduct abused the institution of marriage); Robinson v. Gov’t of the District of 
Columbia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (claiming plaintiff’s liberty interest in possessing an 
unsealed container of alcohol in public was not fundamental and protected; such possession is not 
deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
as required by Glucksberg); Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 
602, 632 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting Obergefell but holding that under Glucksberg the plaintiff’s 
asserted fundamental liberty interest in engaging in bondage, discipline, dominance, submission, 
sadism, and masochism is clearly not protected or judicially enforceable under the Due Process 
Clause: “[t]here is no basis to conclude that tying up a willing submissive sex partner and 
subjecting him or her to whipping, choking, or other forms of domination is deeply rooted in the 
nation’s history and traditions or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).   
 221. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175. 
 222. 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016). 
 223. Id.; see also N.M.S.A. 1978, § 30-2-4. 
 224. Brandenberg, 376 P.3d at 838. 
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important right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.225 
Brandenberg undertook a detailed discussion of the Glucksberg 
formula, noting the United States Supreme Court’s call for avoiding 
the transformation of liberties protected by the Due Process Clause on 
the basis of the Court’s policy preferences.226 The New Mexico high 
court pointed to Obergefell’s concern that defining an asserted right by 
reference to historical practices was inconsistent with the Court’s 
fundamentality analysis in its right to marry decisions.227 However, 
Brandenberg concluded, as Obergefell did not expressly overrule 
Glucksberg, the Court’s 1997 decision controlled.228 Consequently, 
Obergefell’s concern with defining rights by looking to historical 
practices was not pertinent to the analysis of the physician-assisted 
suicide issue. Unlike the marriage cases grounded in a tradition of a 
fundamental right to marry, “we do not have such a tradition to fall 
back on regarding physician aid in dying.”229 
The aforementioned and admittedly small sample of post-
Obergefell cases reveal that Glucksberg not only survived but is being 
employed by courts in rejecting substantive due process claims in areas 
outside the physician-assisted suicide setting addressed in the Court’s 
1997 decision. Apart from Juliana’s recognition of a fundamental 
liberty interest in a life-sustaining climate system, the lower federal 
court and New Mexico Supreme Court decisions acknowledged 
Obergefell but turned to and applied Glucksberg in declining to find a 
“new” (i.e., non-historical and non-traditional) fundamental right 
judicially protected by and enforceable under the Due Process Clause. 
Aware of the perils of prediction, it is my view that a majority of the 
currently constituted Court would reject the view that Obergefell 
overruled Glucksberg and that the latter decision’s history-and-
tradition methodology is no longer applicable to the resolution of 
substantive due process issues. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Alito have already made clear their adherence to the 
Glucksbergian traditionalist methodology in their opinions. And 
statements made by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh prior to joining 
the Court—in which Gorsuch criticized “reasoned judgment” 
 
 225. Id. at 850. 
 226. Id. at 845. 
 227. Id. at 848; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 228. Brandenberg, 376 P.3d at 847. 
 229. Id. at 848. 
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interpretation of the Constitution,230 and Kavanaugh observed in a 
post-Obergefell speech that Glucksberg is an important precedent231—
suggests that the newest members of the Court regard Glucksberg as 
still viable and governing precedent. If correct, this prediction can have 
significant implications for future substantive due process cases 
claiming unconstitutional governmental deprivations of liberty, 
including, for example, the judicial methodology employed in deciding 
challenges to alleged state denials of reproductive choice.232 
CONCLUSION 
 The arguments that Obergefell effectively overruled Glucksberg, 
“laid to waste the entire Glucksberg edifice,” and definitively replaced 
the history-and-tradition test with a holistic due process inquiry233 have 
not (yet) been borne out. At this juncture it appears, generally speaking, 
that Obergefell’s generational approach to the meaning of protected 
and protectable “liberty” interests in the same-sex marriage context 
has not created a methodological sea change in substantive due process 
jurisprudence. Whether and how the Court, sans Justice Kennedy, will 
ultimately decide the subject addressed in this essay is an important 
and intriguing question.234 But at this point the answer to the w(h)ither 
Glucksberg query is that Glucksberg lives. 
 
 
 
 230. See supra note 92. 
 231. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 232. This obviously important issue merits further consideration beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
 233. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 234. As is another critical question beyond the scope of this essay: whether Obergefell might 
be overruled. As posited by Professor Geoffrey Stone: “In light of the vehemence of the 
dissenting justices and their harsh condemnation of the legitimacy of the decision, it is certainly 
possible that at some point down the road a majority of justices holding similar views might 
jettison the precedent . . . .” GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 524 (2017).  
